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TORTS-GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY-THE INTENTIONAL TORTS
EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE
AN ACTION AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR NEGLIGENT
FAILURE TO DISCHARGE OR SUPERVISE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE WHO
SUBSEQUENTLY COMMITS INTENTIONALLY TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Shearer v. United States (1983)
On June 2, 1979, while off-base and on an authorized leave, Private
Vernon Shearer of the United States Army was shot to death by Private
Andrew Heard.' Heard had served three years for the brutal killing of a
German woman when he was stationed abroad, and was released from
prison four months before he shot Private Shearer.2 Prior to Shearer's kid-
napping and murder, several of Heard's superiors formally reported their
judgments that Heard was unsuitable for military service and recommended
his discharge. 3 Despite these admonitions, a psychiatric evaluation of Heard
was never performed, and he remained in the Army after his release from
prison.
4
The administratrix of Shearer's estate brought suit against the federal
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).5 The complaint
alleged that the government was negligent in failing to properly supervise or
discharge Heard. 6 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania granted the government's motion to dismiss the complaint,
reasoning that the claim was barred under the Feres doctine. 7 On appeal,
1. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102, 1104 (3d Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc
denied, 729 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984)
(No. 84-194). Shearer, who had joined the Army four months earlier, had been sta-
tioned at Fort Bliss, Texas. Id. Shearer was kidnapped at gunpoint by Heard and
shot to death in New Mexico. Id. Heard was also off-duty. Id. Heard pleaded nolo
contendere to the crime of second degree murder and firearm enhancement. Id at 1104
n.2.
2. Id. at 1104. The victim of the earlier offense died from head injuries inflicted
by Heard through the use of a wrench and liftingjack. d. Heard served three years
of a four year prison term for manslaughter. Id.
3. Id. Heard's battalion commander in Germany had recommended that Heard
be discharged. Id. Two of the commander's superiors had adopted the recommenda-
tion. Id One commented that Heard's discharge "would be in the best interest of
Private Heard and the United States Army." Id (quoting Indictment of Private
Heard, App. at 15a).
4. Id. The Army failed to make a final determination regarding Heard's mili-
tary status. Id.
5. Id. at 1105. See Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-
2680 (1982). For a discussion of the FTCA, see notes 10-13 and accompanying text
in/pa.
6. 723 F.2d at 1105. The complaint further alleged that the government was
negligent in failing to warn other servicemen of Heard's violent propensities. Id.
7. Shearer v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 672, 673-74 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (citing
(1017)
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the Third Circuit8 reversed, holding that neither the Feres doctrine nor the
intentional torts exception to the FTCA barred a claim against the govern-
ment for negligent supervision resulting in a serviceman's kidnapping and
murder of another serviceman who was off the military base on authorized
leave. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc denied,
729 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984)
(No. 84-194).
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States govern-
ment was immune from civil liability.9 In 1946, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.10 The FTCA provides that the federal government is
liable in tort "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances . . . . ",I This broad waiver of immunity is
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). The district court concluded that the
decisions alleged to be negligent were made by "military personnel . . . in the course
of the performance of their military duty," and thus the claim was precluded under
Feres. Id. at 674. For a discussion of the Feres doctrine, see notes 14-29 and accom-
panying text tnfra. Because the court found that the claim was barred by Feres, it did
not decide the issue whether the claim would also be precluded under the "inten-
tional torts exception" to the FTCA. 576 F. Supp. at 675-76 n.4. For a discussion of
the intentional torts exception, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text 1nfra.
8. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons, Garth, and Higginbotham. Judge
Higginbotham wrote the opinion for the court in which Judge Gibbons joined.
Judge Garth filed a dissenting opinion.
9. Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amend-
ment: An Interpretive Analysi, 54 N.C.L. REV. 497, 507-08 (1976) rhereinafter cited as
Boger]. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is said to have evolved from the early
common law maxim that "the king can do no wrong." See Note, There is No Cause of
Action Implied Under the Constitution Against Government Ofticis for Intentional Constitutional
Torts Occurring Incident to Military Service, 27 VILL. L. REV. 858, 860 n.1 1 (1982). Al-
though this maxim was not accepted in the United States, the principle evolved that
the federal government could not be held liable for its actions unless it had consented
to liability. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); Laswell v. Brown, 683
F.2d 261, 264 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). While the govern-
ment itself was immune, the personal liability of its employees was governed by state
statutes and the common law. Boger, supra, at 509.
10. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, Pub. L. No. 601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1982)). Prior to 1946, the Congress had
allowed exceptions to the federal government's immunity through the enactment of
private bills. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); Boger, supra note 9, at
508. This procedure proved cumbersome. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140; 1 L. JAYSON, HAN-
DLING FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS: ADMINISTRAIIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 58
(1983). Congress had previously waived federal government immunity for breach of
contract actions. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Section 1346(b) of the Act confers jurisdiction on
the federal courts to hear claims
for money damages . .. injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Unless Congress has consented to the waiver of immu-
1018 [Vol. 29: p. 1017
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limited, however, both in the express language of the FTCA' 2 and in its
judicial construction. 13
The most notable judicially created exception to the waiver of govern-
ment immunity is the Feres doctrine.14 In Feres v. United States,'5 three ser-
vicemen, injured while on active duty, alleged that their injuries were a
result of government negligence.16 The Supreme Court held "that the Gov-
ernment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to ser-
vicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service."' 17
nity for the alleged tort, the federal courts are without jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.S.C. 1981).
The phrase "negligent or wrongful act" has been construed as covering more
than merely negligent conduct. Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1954). The language "in accordance with the law of the place," requires that the
alleged tort meet the elements of a tort cognizable under the appropriate state law to
be a valid claim. Boger, supra note 9, at 521.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1982). One of the most litigated exceptions concerns
discretionary functions on the part of government officials. See id. This section ex-
empts from liability the exercise or failure to exercise a "discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused." Id For a general discussion of the "discre-
tionary function" exception, see Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act." The Development
and Appl'cation of the Discretionaty Function Exemption, 13 CUM. L. REv. 535 (1983).
13. See Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1772 (1983); 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 10, § 237; Schwartz & Means, The Needfor
Federal Product Liabifity and Toxic Torts Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L.
REV. 1088, 1104-05 n.72 (1983). In construing the FTCA, courts have been guided
by the principle that congressional waiver of sovereign immunity will not be ex-
tended beyond what has been directed by Congress. See United States v. King, 395
U.S. 1 (1969). The Supreme Court has interpreted the FTCA as waiving immunity
only for claims existing at common law rather than the creation of new causes of
action. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950); 1 L. JAYSON, supra note
10, § 217.01. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress intended to impose liabil-
ity on the federal government only when the government would otherwise be liable if
it were a private citizen. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
14. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). For a discussion of the Feres
doctrine, see notes 14-29 and accompanying text infra.
15. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
16. See id. at 136-38. Feres actually involved three consolidated cases. Id. at 138.
In the first case, plaintiffs decedent died while he was on active duty during a fire in
his barracks. Id. at 136. The complaint alleged that the government was negligent in
housing the serviceman in a barracks with a defective heating system. Id. The sec-
ond case involved a plaintiff who underwent surgery performed by military physi-
cians during the plaintiffs term of active duty. Id at 137. Subsequent to his
discharge from the Army, another operation revealed a towel which had been left in
his stomach after the first operation. Id Similarly, the third action was predicated
on negligent medical treatment by Army surgeons, received while plaintiffs decedent
was on active duty. Id
17. Id at 146. Four reasons were set forth by the Court for the doctrine. See
Note, supra note 9, at 866-67. The first was that since the FTCA was only intended to
make the government liable under circumstances where a private person would be
liable in tort, the Court did not believe that Congress intended to impose liability for
military acts which would have no counterpart in the private sector. Feres, 340 U.S.
at 141. The second reason advanced was that Congress had already established,
3
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In United States v. Brown,' 8 the Supreme Court explained that the Feres
exclusion was based upon a recognition of the "special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on disci-
pline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts commit-
ted in the course of military duty .... "'9 In Brown, the Court held that a
under the Veteran Benefits Act, a comprehensive compensation program for those
injured or killed in the armed services. Id. at 144. Third, one of the primary pur-
poses of the FTCA was to remove Congress' heavy burden of granting relief in pri-
vate bills, yet there had been few such bills from the armed forces. Id. Finally, while
under the FTCA, the law of the state "where the act or omission occurred" was to be
determinative in the inquiry of whether the plaintiff stated a cognizable claim in tort,
the relationship between the soldier and the government was too "distinctively fed-
eral in character" to be subject to variations in state tort law. Id. at 142-44 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947)).
The Feres doctrine has been the source of extensive commentary, much of it
critical. For discussions criticizing Feres, see Comment, Tort Remedtesfor Servicemen
Injured by Militay Equipment- A Case for Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 601,
629-35 (1980); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to
FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102-21 (1979). For a general discussion of
Feres, see Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1973); Rhodes, The Feres
Doctrite After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (Spring 1976); Note, The Supreme
Court and the Tort Claims Act. End of an Enhghtened Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L.J. 267 (1978).
Feres has also provoked criticism by the federal courts. See, e.g., Thomason v.
Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Peluso v.
United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) ("Only the Supreme Court
can reverse [Feres]. While we would welcome that result we are not hopeful in view of
the number of recent instances in which, having been afforded the opportunity, it
declined to grant certiorari. Possibly the only route to relief is by an application to
Congress."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973). See also Everett v. United States, 492 F.
Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("To the extent Feres and its successors have decided
to insulate military activity from judicial review, the Court has no warrant to in-
trude, despite inequities which may nevertheless remain.").
While the three cases consolidated in Feres all concerned negligence actions
against the government, Feres has been held to be equally applicable to intentional
torts. See Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 127 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); Everett, 492
F. Supp. at 321; Note, supra note 9, at 870-71. "Any other result would mean that the
Feres-based immunity of [the] armed forces. . . could be abrogated through an exer-
cise of pleading." Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.D.C. 1978) (foot-
note omitted), aJdmem on other grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
If a claim falls within the prohibition of Feres, a federal court is without jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim. Broudy, 661 F.2d at 127-28.
18. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
19. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. The Supreme Court has subsequently extended the
Feres doctrine to bar third party indemnity suits against the government for damages
paid by the third party to a member of the military who was injured in the course of
military service. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
In Stencel, the plaintiff, a National Guard officer, had sued the manufacturer of his
aircraft which malfunctioned during an emergency, causing him permanent injury.
Id. at 667. The Court concluded that the reasoning of Feres and Brown applied
equally to the issue of whether third party indemnity actions against the United
States should be barred. Id. at 673.
The lower federal courts have extended the Feres doctrine to preclude even non-
derivative claims by civilians based upon injuries of military personnel arising inci-
dent to military service. See, e.g., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
1020 [Vol. 29: p. 10 17
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veteran's claim for injuries caused by the negligence of the military subse-
quent to the plaintiff's discharge from the military was "not incident to the
military service" and therefore not precluded by Feres.
20
The federal courts of appeals have applied Feres to bar all FTCA claims
by servicemen for injuries suffered while they were actually carrying out mil-
itary orders.2 1 Further, the courts of appeals agree that Feres bars claims by
1983) (claim for genetically transmitted cancer caused by father's exposure to radia-
tion while on active duty in United States Army), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1272 (1984);
Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff born with congenital
rubella syndrome as a result of negligent medical treatment his mother received
while in the Air Force), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1772 (1983); DeFont v. United States,
453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir.) (per curiam) (widow and children of deceased serviceman's
claim for loss of financial support and companionship), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910
(1972).
The reasoning for this extension is that third party claims would involve the
same concerns involved in Feres: a civilian court would be "second-guessing" the
military's judgment, and members of the Armed Services would have to testify as to
each other's actions. Mondelli, 711 F.2d at 569 (citing Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)); Seveney v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 653,
660 (D.R.I. 1982). Such suits threaten military discipline even though there be "no
command relationship between the claimant and the individual tortfeasor." Scales,
685 F.2d at 973 (citing Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982)).
More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Feres doctrine in holding that
enlisted personnel of the armed forces could not recover damages for the alleged
constitutional violations of a superior officer. See Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct.
2362, 2368 (1983).
20. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113. Although plaintiff injured his knee while on active
duty, the operation alleged to have been negligently performed, and which resulted
in permanent damage to plaintiffs knee, occurred after the plaintiffs discharge from
the Army. Id. at 110-11. This injury did not "arise out of" military service, despite
the fact that plaintiffs treatment in the VA Hospital was linked to his prior term of
service. Id. at 112.
In holding that the Feres doctrine did not preclude plaintiffs claim, the Court
relied on a pre-Feres case. Id at 112-13 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949)). In Brooks, one serviceman was killed and another injured when their car was
struck by a United States Army truck. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50. At the time of the
accident the servicemen were on leave and driving on a public highway. Id. The
Brooks Court held that a claim on behalf of the servicemen against the government
was actionable under the FTCA. Id. at 50, 54. The Court rejected the government's
argument of the dire consequences that might result from holding the government
liable under the facts of its case. Id at 52. The Brooks Court had reasoned that the
accident "had nothing to do with the [servicemen's] army careers," since the injuries
were not caused by their service "except in the sense that all human events depend on
what has already transpired." Id The Brown Court stated that Feres had not over-
ruled Brooks. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. The Brown Court concluded that its facts were
governed by Brooks rather than Feres, since the injury in Brown did not occur while the
plaintiff "was on active duty or subject to military discipline." Id.
21. Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982) (commanding officers negli-
gently ordered deceased to attend three atomic bomb detonations; Feres precluded
claim for cancer contracted from exposure), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Monaco
v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (Feres precluded claim by serviceman
who was negligently ordered to perform calisthentic exercises on field located near
testing site of atomic bomb), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Hale v. United States,
452 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1971) (serviceman, although on valid pass and off-base, was
10211983-84]
5
Schiff: Torts - Government Immunity - The Intentional Torts Exception to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
servicemen for injuries which arose during their term of active duty while
they are partaking of the services and benefits to which military status enti-
tles them.22 The plaintiff servicemen's on-duty/off-duty status, while signifi-
cant, has been identified as only one factor in the determination of whether
his claim "arose out of" or was incurred "in the course of activity incident
to" military service. 23 Finally, whether the serviceman is on or off-base at
the time of the relevant inquiry also has been recognized as a factor in the
subject to orders and directions of Military Police after being picked up by M.P.'s
while hitchhiking; therefore Feres barred his claim for damages for injuries suffered
while following M.P.'s orders); Breunig v. United States, No. 83-290 (D. Minn. Oct.
7, 1983) (hut in which servicemen had been ordered to remain during typhoon
caught on fire; Feres precluded claims for their injuries and deaths).
Even if a servicemen is not acting pursuant to military orders, Feres precludes an
FTCA claim if he is subject to military discipline at the time of government negli-
gence. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (although deceased
was not ordered to fly in military aircraft, by riding in aircraft he was subject to
military discipline), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); Herreman v. United States, 476
F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973) (same).
22. See Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (riding horse rented
from military-owned stable); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.
1966) (swimming in pool on military base); Degentesh v. United States, 230 F. Supp.
763 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (riding bus to military-sponsored beach party); Richardson v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Va. 1964) (drinking in non-commissioned of-
ficer's bar).
Another line of cases barring servicemen's claims under Feres involves injuries
stemming from treatment in military hospitals and medical facilities. See Johnson v.
United States, 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1980) (negligent release of serviceman from hos-
pital), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.
1974) (negligently performed surgery), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Peluso v.
United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (improper diagnosis failed to de-
tect condition from which serviceman died), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Shults v.
United States, 421 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1969) (negligent emergency treatment).
Apparently, the use of benefits such as medical treatment must occur while the
serviceman is on active duty in order for Feres to preclude a claim for injuries. See
Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (claim by veteran for medical malprac-
tice at Veteran's Administration Hospital subsequent to plaintiff's discharge from
military not precluded by Feres). For a discussion of Brown, see notes 18-20 and ac-
companying text supra.
23. Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 142 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 904 (1980). When the servicemen is on furlough or off-duty when he is injured,
Feres is less likely to be found to be a bar. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th
Cir. 1980) (serviceman was on furlough when he was injured by government negli-
gence while on military base; Feres did not preclude claim); Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d
866 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same). The fact that a serviceman is off-duty does
not necessarily preclude Feres from barring an FTCA claim when the serviceman is
still subject to military discipline. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1979) (deceased, although off-duty at time of airplane crash, was under disci-
pline and control of military; therefore Feres precluded claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1044 (1980); Herreman v. United States, 476 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973) (same).
When the tortious act has occurred while the serviceman has been on-duty Feres
has usually been found to bar his claim. See United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th
Cir. 1968) (decedents on-duty at time of airplane crash), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053
(1969); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (decedent on-
duty at time of exposure to nuclear radiation).
1022 [Vol. 29: p. 1017
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Feres analysis. 24
In applying Feres, the Third Circuit has focused on the serviceman's
status.25 Under the Third Circuit's analysis, when the tortious government
conduct took place while the serviceman was acting pursuant to orders, Feres
has precluded an FTCA claim. 26 The Third Circuit has indicated that
whether the serviceman is on or off-duty may be determinative of the out-
come under Feres.
2 7
24. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1980). The fact that
the injury occurred while the serviceman was on the military base appears to be a
factor militating against plaintiff's recovery. Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d
1149 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (deceased off-duty at time of fatal motor vehicle
accident while on navy depot); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.
1966) (claim for serviceman who drowned in swimming pool located on military base
even if serviceman was off-duty at the time was barred by Feres); Knight v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (same), affdmem., 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.
1973). Other cases have held that the fact that the serviceman was on the military
base does not preclude an FTCA claim. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th
Cir. 1980) (injuries occurring while off-duty even though on military base are not
"incident to service"); accord Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (claim for death occurring on military base when serviceman was on a weekend
pass was not precluded by Feres).
25. See Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1976) (Feres doctrine
turns on serviceman's status), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Henning v. United
States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971) (Feres decision is predicated upon service-
man's military status), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). The district courts within
the Third Circuit have also adopted this approach. See, e.g., Sheppard v. United
States, 294 F. Supp. 7, 9 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (active duty status of serviceman precluded
claim under Feres, whether negligent government employees were military or non-
military personnel was immaterial).
Courts from other circuits which have addressed the issue also have focused on
the status of the injured serviceman rather than the status of the tortfeasor. See
Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (civilian employees of
federal government were negligent but serviceman was on active duty at time of
incident; Feres precluded claim), pert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); United States v.
Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969).
26. Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983) (injuries arising from
serviceman's exposure to atomic radiation when he was ordered to stand near site of
nuclear explosion precluded by Feres), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1272 (1984); Jaffee v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (same), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982), noted in the Third Circuit Review, 27 VILL L. REV. 858, 861 (1982).
27. See Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1072 (1977). In Thomason, the plaintiff, a member of the United States Army, was
struck by an automobile driven by a serviceman while plaintiff was riding his motor-
cycle on the Army base. Id. at 956. In holding that Feres precluded a claim under tile
FTCA, the court stated that not only was the plaintiff in a " 'present for duty' status"
at the time of the accident, he was also "not on any type of leave or pass." Id. at 957
(quoting Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J. 1975)).
A district court in the Third Circuit has held that Feres did not preclude a claim
for a serviceman's death, using the same reasoning which the Third Circuit devel-
oped in Thomason. See Byson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In
Btyson, the court, in holding that Feres did not bar plaintiff's claim, noted that at the
time of the injury, the deceased was on a weekend leave and therefore "was not
acting under compulsion of orders. . . [nor] on a military mission." Id. at 914. Fur-
thermore, the court emphasized, his injuries were not significantly related to his use
1983-841 1023
7
Schiff: Torts - Government Immunity - The Intentional Torts Exception to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Another question which has arisen in Feres analysis is whether the court
should focus upon the status of the plaintiff-serviceman at the time of the
alleged tortious conduct or at the time of the serviceman's resulting injury. 28
The Third Circuit has joined an apparent majority among the courts of ap-
peals in holding that the relevant inquiry is the status of the serviceman at
the time the tortious act allegedly attributable to the government took
place. 2
9
of benefits or services available to him because of his status as a member of the armed
forces. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Bryson, see note 89 infra.
Thomason and Bgyson indicate that whether a serviceman is on or off the military
base at the time of the Feres inquiry is not controlling. Thomason, 539 F.2d at 957;
Byson, 463 F. Supp. at 913-14.
Some cases in the Third Circuit dealing with claims against the government for
medical malpractice while the plaintiffs were in the military appear to look only at
whether the serviceman was on active duty, and not whether the serviceman was off-
duty at the time of the alleged negligence, in order for Feres to preclude the claim. See
Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1973); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1016 (1972). It generally has been held, however, that a benefit of military status
such as medical treatment is necessarily "incident to military service." Woodside v.
United States, 606 F.2d 134, 142 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
28. Compare Breunig v. United States, No. 83-290 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 1983) (claim
precluded under Feres because injuries occurred incident to plaintiff's service; fact
that part of tortious act occurred prior to plaintiff's enlistment in service irrelevant)
with Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495, 497 (5th Cir. 1973) (inquiry under Feres
is whether the tortious government act took place incident to plaintiff's decedent's
military service).
29. See Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1272 (1984); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1016 (1972). At the district court level, the inquiry likewise has focused on
the time of the negligent act. See Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.
Pa. 1964). In Mondelht plaintiff's father was exposed to nuclear radiation while he
was on active duty. Mondeli, 711 F.2d at 568. The Court held that Feres precluded
plaintiff's claims for congenital birth defects caused by her father's exposure. Id. at
569. In Henning, the court held that a plaintiffs claim for injuries suffered subsequent
to his discharge from the military was precluded by Feres because the government's
alleged medical malpractice occurred while the plaintiff was still on active duty.
Henning, 446 F.2d at 776-77. The court stated that Feres focused "not upon when the
injury occurs or when the claim becomes actionable, but rather the time of, and the
circumstances surrounding the negligent act." Id at 777. In Schwartz, a radioactive
dye was inserted in plaintiffs sinus for an x-ray while plaintiff was on active duty.
Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. at 537-38. The court stated that any injuries occurring subse-
quent to his discharge, predicated upon the negligent insertion of the dye while plain-
tiff was on active duty, would be precluded by Feres. Id at 539.
This view finds support in the other circuits as well. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown,
683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982) (claims for injuries occurring subsequent to serviceman's
discharge caused by serviceman's exposure to nuclear radiation while on active mili-
tary duty precluded by Feres), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Monaco v. United
States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Johnson
v. United States, 631 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1980) (negligent release of serviceman from
hospital was incident to service regardless of the fact that the damage, caused by his
shooting spree, did not manifest itself until a later time), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018
(1981); Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1973) (deceased negligently
given transfusion of contaminated blood on day he was to be discharged from Army;
claim for subsequent contraction of hepatitis precluded by Feres); Seveney v. United
1024 [Vol. 29: p. 10 17
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One of the most controversial exceptions to the waiver of government
immunity contained in the FTCA is the section 2680(h) "intentional tort"
exception. 30 This section excludes FTCA authorization for "[alny claim
arising out of" intentional tortious conduct. 31 The torts excluded under the
States, 550 F. Supp. 653 (D.R.I. 1982) (claims for injuries occurring subsequent to
serviceman's discharge caused by exposure to nuclear radiation while on active duty
precluded by Feres); Fischer v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(plaintiff was negligently prescribed drug by team physician while a cadet playing
football for the United States Air Force Academy at which time he would not be
considered on active military duty; drug caused injury which manifested itself after
plaintiff had graduated and had become a member of the Air Force; Feres held not to
preclude his claim).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
31. Id. This section exempts from the government's waiver of immunity "[a]ny
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights .. " Id. The legislative history of § 2680(h) has been described as
"meagre." Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). The first time there
was an exclusionary section substantially identical with § 2680(h) was in S.211, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1931). 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 10, § 260.01[l] n.i.. In 1940 a
spokesman for the Department of Justice commented that the section excepted from
liability certain torts which "'would be difficult to make a defense against, and
which are easily exaggerated.' " Id. (quoting Tort Claims Against the United States.-
Hearings on S 2690 Before the Subcomm. on S 2690 of the Senate Comm. on theJudicary, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1940) (statement of Alexander Holtzofl)). Because the torts ex-
cepted were the type that could inflame the trier of facts' passions, there was the
strong probability that judgments would be in amounts far in excess to the amount of
damages actually suffered if the government were liable for these intentional torts.
Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 547 & n.84 (1947).
What little legislative history there is indicates concern for government liability
for deliberate torts. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). At one point
in the Senate hearings the following exchange took place between Senate Committee
members and the Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea:
Mr. Robinson: On that point of deliberate assault that is where some agent
of the government gets in a fight with some fellow?
Mr. Shea: Yes.
Mr. Robinson: And socks him?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: Assuming a C.C.C. automobile runs into a man and damages
him then under the common law, where that still prevails, is not that con-
sidered an assault and is not the action based on assault and battery?
Mr. Shea: I should think not. I would think under the common law rather
that would be trespass on the case.
Mr. Cravens: Trespass on the case?
Mr. Shea: Yes.
Mr. Cravens: I do not remember these things very well, but it seems to me
there are some cases predicated on assault and battery even though they
were personal injury cases.
Mr. Shea: No; I think under the common law pleading you have the same
writ, but it makes a distinction between an assault and negligence.
Mr. Cravens: This refers to a deliberate assault?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: If he hit someone deliberately?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: Is it not intended to exclude negligent assaults?
Mr. Shea: No. An injury caused by negligence could be considered under the bill.
1983-84] 1025
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"intentional tort exception" 32 are to be construed in their "usual, legalistic
sense."
33
Hearings on HR. 5373 and HR. 6463 Before the House Comm. on theJudiciagy, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 33-34 (1942) (emphasis added).
Several commentators have criticized the § 2680(h) exception to the waiver of
government immunity. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08
(1958); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.13 (1956); Comment, supra,
at 547; Note, Federal Torts Claims Act-Exceptions-Intentional Torts, 7 VAND. L. REV.
283, 285 (1954). One commentator has suggested that negligent claims are just as
susceptible to exaggeration as are intentional torts. K. DAVIS, supra, § 25.08, at 470-
71. Furthermore, the fact that claims under the FTCA are tried without a jury
would appear to alleviate in part the government's concern over the exaggeration of
intentional tort claims. Comment, supra, at 547 n.84. Professors Harper and James
have argued that by excepting intentional torts from government liability such con-
duct is less likely to be deterred, since "the deterrent pressure of liability may well be
put on the most effective spot if the master is made responsible." F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra, § 29.13, at 1655 (footnotes omitted). As one commentator has noted,
§ 2680 "creates an anomalous situation in which the plaintiff tries tc prove a slight
breach of duty while the Government attempts to show that its employees, though
acting within the scope of their employment, were guilty of an intentional harm."
Note, supra, at 285. See also Comment, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Government Liability for the Negligent Failure to Prevent an Assault and Battery by a Federal
Employee, 69 GEO. L.J. 803, 818 n.95 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Section
2680(h) ].
There has also been some dissatisfaction with the section on the part of the
courts. See, e.g., Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 921 (1976); Gale v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 260 (D.S.C. 1981); Taylor v.
United States, 513 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1981). In the words of one court, "[i]t would
be much more pleasant to reach a decision based on what this Court wishes Congress
had said, rather that what it did say." Taylor, 513 F. Supp. at 650.
In 1974 the section was amended to include the following:
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law en-
forcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title [28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)] shall apply to
any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or ma-
licious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law
enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empow-
ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for
violations of Federal law.
Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50, 50 (1974) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(n) (1982)). This amendment was added in response to
tortious conduct by federal law enforcement officials in conducting investigations.
See S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2789, 2790-91; Boger, supra note 9, at 500-07. At least one commentator has
questioned the distinction for purposes of liability between law enforcement officials
and other employees of the federal government. See Boger, supra note 9, at 540. "A
deliberate battery is no less outrageous if inflicted by a mailman . . . than if inflicted
by an FBI agent." Id.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 268C(h) (1982). This section commonly has been referred to
as the "intentional torts exception." Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976); Boger, supra note 9, at 518. The section, however, omits certain inten-
tional torts, such as trespass and invasion of privacy. Boger, supra note 9, at 518. For
the pertinent text of § 2680(h), see note 31 supra.
33. Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34, 37 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (citing Lam-
bertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring) (jumping
1026 [Vol. 29: p. 1017
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Where the sole cause of plaintiff's injury is a federal employee's inten-
tional tort, section 2680(h) precludes an FTCA claim. 34 However, where
on plaintiffs back, although done as a joke, was technically a battery), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 921 (1976)). Therefore, in order to fall within one of these exceptions it is neces-
sary that the technical elements of the tort, as it is recognized at common law, be
satisfied. Lambertson, 528 F.2d at 443-44. The Restatement defines an assault in the
following language:
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of
such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965). According to the Restatement, one
is subject to liability for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the per-
son of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a
contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results.
Id § 18 (1965). See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. It is
necessary that the actor intended to cause the unconsented to contact, although it is
not necessary that he intended or could have reasonably foreseen the harm to the
plaintiff. Lamberlson, 528 F.2d at 444; PROSSER, supra, § 8, at 36; F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 31, § 3.3, at 216 (1956). In Lambertson, an employee of the United
States Department of Agriculture jumped on the plaintiff's back, proceeding to ride
the plaintiff "piggy back" as a practical joke. Lambertson, 528 F.2d at 442. This con-
tact caused the plaintiff to fall on a meat hook, suffering severe facial injuries. Id.
Since under the technical elements of battery, it was not necessary that the employee
intended the injury, but merely that he intended the contact, plaintiffs claim against
the government was barred under § 2680(h). Id. at 444-45.
Whether the elements of the common law tort are met will depend on the con-
trolling state law. Moffitt, 430 F. Supp. at 37; Moos v. United 3tates, 118 F. Supp.
275 (D. Minn. 1954), aj'd, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955). In Moffitt, the court denied a
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint because the question of fact remained whether
the tortfeasor, a United States postal employee, had the requisite intent to constitute
a technical assault and battery under the controlling state law. Mofftt, 430 F. Supp.
at 38. The complaint had alleged that at the time of plaintiff's attack, the employee
"was in a state of mental derangement." Id. In Moos, a surgeon in a veteran's hospi-
tal negligently operated on the wrong leg of plaintiff. Moos, 118 F. Supp. at 276. The
court held, however, that under the controlling state law, this was technically a bat-
tery and thus barred by § 2680(h). Id Cf Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850
(E.D. Va. 1964) (surgeon's operation on wrong knee, although technically an assault
and battery, was actionable under FTCA).
34. See Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 804 & n.6. The exceptions
from federal government liability may not be evaded "merely by the artistry of...
pleading." Coffey v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D. Conn. 1975). There-
fore, courts have continually stated that it is not the fact that plaintiff alleges his
claim to be in negligence that is controlling; rather it is whether the claim in sub-
stance falls within one of the exceptions to the waiver of government immunity.
Gaudet v. United States, 517 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Moffitt v.
United States, 430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See also Fitch v. United States, 513
F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.) (allegation of government negligence more properly character-
ized as misrepresentation, thus excluded under § 2680(h)), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 866
(1975); Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.) (false imprisonment), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 855 (1964); Klein v. United States, 268 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1959) (false arrest);
11
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government negligence is alleged as the cause of an intentional tort, the fed-
eral circuits disagree as to whether the intentional torts exception precludes
a claim against the government. 35 In these cases the party sued is not the
intentional tortfeasor, but rather the federal government, for negligence in
allowing the intentional tort to occur.
36
The Second Circuit was the first court of appeals to squarely address the
question of whether government negligence for failure to prevent an assault
and battery could be actionable under the FTCA.37 In Panella v. United
States,38 a patient in a federally-operated mental hospital was assaulted by
Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1953) (assault and battery), cert. denied
347 U.S. 933 (1954); Nichols v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Miss. 1964)
(assault and battery). As stated by one court, to permit the plaintiff through his
pleadings to " 'dress[ ] up the substance' of battery in the 'garments' of negligence
would be to 'judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively
turned away at the front door.' " Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 445 (2d
Cir.) (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921
(1976).
35. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 804 (citations omitted). While
one court has regarded § 2680(h) as a "seemingly simple exception," it has noted the
variance in interpreting § 2680(h) when the plaintiffs claim is predicated on negli-
gence rather than the intentional tort. SeeTaylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647,
650 (D.S.C. 1981).
36. In these cases, the complaint alleges that the government's negligence consti-
tutes a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 662
F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (negligent failure to control the conduct of the assailant);
Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1981) (failure to provide psychiat-
ric treatment for the assailant); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(negligence in hiring assailant as a government employee).
In determining whether the negligence of an actor can constitute a proximate
cause for an injury which stems from the intervening tortious conduct of another
party, courts have emphasized the foreseeability of the intervening act. Eldredge,
Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 125 (1937). Generally
one is not expected to anticipate the intentional wrongdoings of another. Id. (citing
F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 505 (1926)). However, according to the
Restatement, "[ilf the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner
is the hazard . . . which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether . . . inten-
tionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
In order for there to be negligence on the part of the actor, there must be an
existing duty to prevent the intervening assault. Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control
the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934). Generally, this duty arises only if there
exists a "special relationship" between the actor and either the party who committed
the intervening intentional act, or the plaintiff. Id. at 904. Examples of relationships
between the defendant and the assailant in which the affirmative duty to control the
conduct of the assailant arises are the parent-child and employer-employee relation-
ships. Id. at 893-96. Examples of relationships between the defendant and the plain-
tiff from which the affirmative duty to control the conduct of another arises are when
the custody of the plaintiff has been entrusted to the defendant by law or when the
plaintiff is a business invitee of the defendant. Id. at 899, 903. For a discussion of
liability in negligence when there has been an intervening intentional act by another
party, see generally, Feezer & Favour, Intervening Crime and Liabiity for Negligence, 24
MINN. L. REV. 635 (1940)).
37. See Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954).
38. d.
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an inmate. 39 The Panella court held that the intentional torts exception did
not preclude the patient's action under the FTCA for the government negli-
gence. 4° The court noted that for purposes of section 2680(h), a distinction
should be drawn between government-employee tortfeasors and third-party
tortfeasors. 4 1 The court stated that although section 2680(h) bars suit
against the government where the intentional tortfeasor is a government
agent, that section is not a bar to suit against the government where the
intentional tortfeasor is a third-party. 42 The court reasoned that since there
can be no vicarious liability against the government for the intentional torts
of a non-employee, any claim against the government must lie in negli-
gence. 43 Thus, the court concluded, when the assailant is not a government
employee, "a negligence action is not merely an alternative form of remedy
to an action for assault but negligence is rather the essence of plaintiff's
claim."
44
The federal employee-third party distinction for determining govern-
ment liability for negligence has been accepted by the majority of courts
which have addressed the issue. 45 In Naisbitt v. United Slates,46 the Tenth
39. Id. at 623. As part of a criminal sentence, plaintiff had been placed at the
hospital to undergo treatment for drug addiction. Id. The plaintiff subsequently
sued the government for negligence in failing to provide adequate security so as to
guard against the assault. Id
40. Id. at 625.
41. Id at 624-26.
42. Id. at 625.
43. Id. The court hypothesized two examples, one in which the assailant was a
government employee and the other a third party. Id. at 624. In the first case the
court observed that the assault, in the absence of § 2680(h), would give rise to vicari-
ous government liability regardless of proof of government negligence. d. There-
fore, the court stated, one could infer that § 2680(h) was intended to retain
government immunity in the first situation, no matter what tort the complaint al-
leged. d. The court explained that when the assailant is a third party, it was more
difficult to draw such an inference, since absent negligence there could be no govern-
ment liability (as the government would not be vicariously liable for the intentional
tort of a third party). Id
44. Id. at 624. The Panela court observed that its interpretation of § 2680(h)
found support in the section's legislative history, which revealed that Congress' fore-
most concern was providing immunity for assaults by government agents. Id. at 626.
For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2680(h), see note 31 supra.
45. See, e.g., Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983); Naisbitt v.
United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980); Hughes v.
Sullivan, 514 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1980), a'd sub nom. Hughes v. United States,
662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Muniz v. United States, 397 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1962) (en banc), aft'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp.
647 (D.S.C. 1981); Gale v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 574 (D.S.C. 1980), vacated, 525
F. Supp. 260 (D.S.C. 1981); Pennington v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Pendarvis v.
United States, the court held that even where there is an antecedent intentional tort by
a federal employee, a claim for subsequent government negligence is precluded under
§ 2680(h). See Pendarvis, 241 F. Supp. 8, 10-11 (D.S.C. 1965). In Pendarvis, the com-
plaint alleged that the plaintiff was injured when he was seized by government of-
ficers. Id. at 9. Subsequently plaintiff was taken to a government hospital "where his
injuries were negligently diagnosed . . . and . . . he was negligently treated .... "
13
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Circuit explicated the distinction drawn by the Second Circuit in Pandla.4 7
The Naisbill court stated that when the assailant is a government employee,
the tort, regardless of whether it is termed negligence, is essentially "an in-
tentional tort attributable to the government. ' ' 48 The court stated that this
was explicable either on the theory of respondeat superior "or because the
employee is closely related to the government."' 49 The Naisbitt court's analy-
sis was not altered by the plaintiffs' allegations that the federal employees
were off-duty at the time they committed the assaults and batteries.50
The federal employee-third party distinction was adopted by the
Id. The court held that any claim for malpractice against government physicians was
precluded under § 2680(h). Id. at 10-11.
The court reasoned that the medical treatment was rendered only because of the
assault. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether
government immunity for negligence should turn on the employment status of the
intentional tortfeasor. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 813 n.53.
46. 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
47. Id. at 1355-56. In Naisbitt, two off-duty members of the United States Air
Force entered a private store and committed "assaults, rapes, batteries and murders
. " Id. at 1351. In all five people were shot, three of them fatally. Id. The
complaint alleged that the government had been negligent in retaining the assailants
in the military or in failing to adequately supervise them. Id.
48. Id. at 1356.
49. Id. Since the government had retained immunity for its employee's inten-
tional torts, the court concluded that "an attempt to establish liability on a negli-
gence basis [wis] indeed an effort to circumvent the retention of immunity provided
in § 2680(h)." Id. Furthermore, the court explained, the assailants' acts were of such
great magnitude that they rendered "insignificant" the government's negligence as a
causal force. Id.
50. See id at 1354-56. This aspect of Naisbit has been criticized by one commen-
tator. See Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 814-15 n.69. Naisbilt fails to
explain how the government can be vicariously liable for an intentional tort when
the employee is off-duty or acting outside the scope of his employment when the
government concededly could not be liable under a respondeat superior theory. Id.
While the Naisbilt court stated that it appears to be the close proximity of the em-
ployee to the government which imputes the intentional tort to the government, the
commentator suggests that the Naisbit court advanced no explanation for "this novel
theory." Id
Nevertheless, it appears to be generally accepted that the fact that the federal
employee is off-duty or not acting within the scope of his employment does not
change the view of courts, which recognize the employee-nonemployee distinction,
that a claim for government negligence is barred by the intentional torts exception.
See Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. United States, 513
F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1981); Pennington v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). See also Gale v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 260 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'g 491 F.
Supp. 574 (D.S.C. 1980).
In Pennington, the complaint alleged that the government was negligent in super-
vising a Deputy United States Marshall, who, after becoming intoxicated, shot the
plaintiff's decedent. Pennington, 406 F. Supp. at 851. The court reasoned that when
an action is predicated on the asserted negligence in hiring or failing to train an
employee, whether the employee was on-duty or off-duty at the time of the assault
loses significance. Id. at 852. The court recognized that a distinction between a non-
employee and an off-duty employee was "not [an] entirely ... satisfactory one." Id
Less satisfactory in the court's view, however, was a distinction between an off-duty
and an on-duty employee. Id.
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Fourth Circuit in Hughes v. United States.5 1 In Hughes, a postal employee had
previously been arrested for taking indecent sexual liberties with a minor.
52
His supervisor allowed the employee to continue working the postal route,
despite the contrary requests of the victim's parent. 53 Several years later, the
employee lured two young girls into his postal truck where he took indecent
sexual liberties with them.5 4 Relying on the reasoning of the district court,
which recognized the government employee-third party assailant distinction
drawn by Panela and Naisbil, the Fourth Circuit held that a claim based on
the government's negligence in retaining the employee was precluded by the
intentional torts exception.
55
In accordance with the distinction first drawn in Panela, federal courts
have generally held that section 2680(h) does not preclude an action under
the FTCA against the government for negligent failure to prevent an assault
by someone other than a federal employee. 56 In Rogers v. United States,57 a
case involving an intentional tort by a third party, the Fourth Circuit held
that the intentional torts exception did not bar a valid claim for government
negligence "even though assault or false imprisonment may be collaterally
involved."58 The Rogers court concluded that a valid negligence claim had
been alleged where the government could be held liable in negligence for
breach of a duty that it had either voluntarily assumed or which had been
imposed by law.
59
51. 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 220. The employee pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. Id
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court affirmed the district court for reasons "adequately stated" by
the district court. Id. (citing Hughes v. Sullivan, 514 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1980),
af'd sub noma. Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981)). The district
court had stated that an earlier Fourth Circuit case (holding that § 2680(h) did not
preclude a negligence claim against the government although one of the :atentional
torts listed in § 2680(h) caused the injury) was distinguishable in that the case in-
volved an intentional tort by one who was not a federal employee. 514 F. Supp. at
670 (citing Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968)). For a discussion of
Rogers, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text bin/a. The district court also rejected
the negligence claim on the basis that the government's negligence was not a proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Hughes, 514 F. Supp. at 670. The court reasoned that there
would have been no injury except for the independent assault and battery of the
government employee. Id.
56. See Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968) (torture by known
sadist); Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962) (assault by prison in-
mate), aj'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1954) (assault by hospital inmate).
57. 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 15. In Rogers, plaintiff, a minor, had been arrested in connection with
a stolen automobile. I. at 13. The complaint alleged that while awaiting trial, a
United States Marshall permitted plaintiff ,o leave in the company of a known sadist
whu had previously been arrested for chaining and physically beating another per-
son. Id. The man took plaintiff to his home after picking him up from the jail and
proceeded to torture the plaintiff. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 14-15. By voluntarily assuming the duty of taking custody of the
plaintiff, the government would have to use due care in exercising that duty. Id. at
15
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Several federal courts have rejected the Panella distinction, adopting a
minority position that negligence claims against the government are not pre-
cluded under the intentional torts exception even where the assailant was a
government employee. 6° In Underwood v. United States,6 ' the complaint al-
leged that supervising officers in the United States Air Force were negligent
in placing an officer on active duty and allowing him access to a gun, in view
of the fact that they knew he had a history of psychiatric problems. 62 After
obtaining the gun, the airman went to his ex-wife's place of employment and
shot her to death. 63 The Fifth Circuit held that because the complaint al-
leged facts which would support a finding that the government's negligence
was a proximate cause of the ex-wife's death under Alabama law, the claim
was not precluded under the intentional torts exception.6 4
One district court in the First Circuit has consistently held that claims
for government negligence in allowing government employees to commit as-
saults and batteries is not precluded by the intentional torts exception. 65 In
Lorilts v. United States,66 a member of a college choral group which had been
invited to West Point was raped by a West Point cadet. 67 The Lora/s court
stated that the complaint alleged a valid negligence claim, since the attack
was a foreseeable consequence of the government's breach of its duty to the
plaintiff.68  More recently, in Schwer v. United States,69 the same court held
14. Furthermore, a court had ordered the U.S. Marshall to provide the plaintiff with
transportation. Id. at 14 n.3.
60. See, e.g., Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (murder
by member of U.S. Air Force); Schwer v. United States, No. 83-1209 (D. Mass. Dec.
1, 1983) (beating death caused by U.S. Navy men); Loritts v. United States, 489 F.
Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980) (rape by West Point cadet).
61. 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 100. The court distinguished another Fifth Circuit case with analo-
gous facts on the basis of the different state law controlling in that case. Id. at 99
(citing United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.) (under Georgia law, inter-
vening criminal act severed precedent negligence as proximate cause of injury), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965)). While Underwood did not specifically address the issue of
whether the assailant was off-duty at the time of assault, its citation and apparent
approval of Panella's employee-non-employee distinction has led some courts to inter-
pret the result in Underwood as resting on the assailant's off-duty status. See Natsbitt,
611 F.2d at 1355 n.4; Pennington, 406 F. Supp. at 852. But see Comment, Section
2680(h), supra note 31, at 819 n.100 ("the Underwood court relied solely on a
duty/causation analysis to permit the plaintiffs claim and did not distinguish be-
tween on- and off-duty assailant") (citing Underwood, 356 F.2d at 98-100).
65. See Schwer v. United States, No. 83-1209 (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 1983); Loritts v.
United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980).
66. 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980).
67. Id. at 1031. West Point had voluntarily undertaken the task to provide es-
corts for plaintiffs choral group. Id. The assault occurred while plaintiff was walking
unescorted at night on the Academy's campus. Id. The complaint alleged that the
government was negligent in failing to provide escorts and in having allowed the
assailant to remain at West Point "despite his demonstrated strange and suspicious
behavior." Id. The court's discussion treated the cadet as a federal employee. See id.
68. Id at 1032. The court emphasized that having voluntarily assumed the
1032 [Vol. 29: p. 10 17
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that the intentional torts exception did not preclude a negligence claim
against the government for the beating death of a civilian at the hands of
four members of the United States Navy. 70 The Schwer court stated that the
claim was "genuinely based on the antecedent negligence of the United
States" either on a theory of common law liability for serving intoxicating
liquors7 1 or on a theory of the government's ability to control the actions of
the sailors.
72
In Liuzzo v. United Slates,73 the district court for the Eastern District of
Michigan criticized the government employee-third party distinction.74 In
Liuzzo, the court argued that the "essence" of plaintiff's claim did not change
from negligence to assault and battery merely because the assault has been
committed by a government employee as opposed to a third party.7 5 The
duty to provide escorts, the government was under the duty to act with due care. Id.
at 1031. Since the risk to plaintiff was foreseeable, the government's negligence could
be said to be a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1031-32. Therefore, this
was not a "situation where a plaintiff by virtue of artful pleading seeks to circumvent
section 2680(h)." Id. at 1031.
In a footnote the court argued that the fact that the assailant was a government
employee should not allow the government to escape liability. Id. at 1032 n.3. The
court observed that "the fortuitous nature of the circumstances following its negli-
gence" should not immunize the government since "[t]here [was] no question that
had the plaintiff been attacked by a civilian or had she fallen into an unmarked
excavation a negligence action would lie." Id.
69. No. 83-1209 (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 1983).
70. Id., slip op. at 4. The complaint alleged that the assailants, who were sta-
tioned in Long Beach, California, were in a highly intoxicated state at the time of the
assault. Id. at 2. It further alleged that the government was negligent in serving the
sailors intoxicating liquor at the enlisted men's club and in allowing the men to enlist
in the Navy and remain in it despite knowledge of their violent propensities. Id.
71. Id. at 4. The court observed that plaintiffs claim was a "classic common law
dram shop claim." Id. The common law recognized that the seller of alcoholic bev-
erages could be liable for the tortious acts of intoxicated persons to whom alcohol was
served. Id. Although California had abrogated this common law doctrine in part by
statute, a seller of alcohol remained liable when he served a minor and that minor
injured another. Id. The court pointed out the complaint alleged that three of the
four sailors who had been involved in the beating were minors at the time of the
incident. Id
72. Id at 4-5. The court stated that because of their status as servicemen, the
sailors were under the supervision and observation of the government. Id at 5.
Therefore, the government could be liable in negligence if, with knowledge of the
sailors' intoxicated condition, it allowed them to leave the ship. Id The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff was not attempting to hold the government liable for their
employees' intentional torts on a respondeat superior theory. Id
73. 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
74. Id. at 929-30. In Liuzzo, plaintiff's decedent was shot by one of the occupants
of a car in which Ku Klux Klansmen were riding. Id at 926. One of the occupants
was an FBI informant. Id The complaint alleged that the FBI was negligent in
authorizing the informant to instigate violent activities, which proximately caused
the deceased's murder. Id. Given the court's rejection of the government employee-
third party distinction, it was unnecessary to determine whether the informant con-
stituted a government employee, or which of the occupants of the car had actually
fired the fatal shot. Id. at 928 n.3, 930.
75. Id at 929-30.
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Liuzzo court concluded that nothing in the legislative history of the FTCA
indicated that § 2680(h) precluded an action against the government when
its negligence caused the plaintiff to be assaulted by a government
employee. 76
Courts within the Third Circuit also have had occasion to decide
whether the intentional torts exception precludes a negligence claim against
the federal government when there has been an intervening intentional tort
by a government employee. In Colins v. UnitedStates,77 the district court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed a complaint which alleged
that the United States Postal Service was negligent in hiring and retaining
the assailant, who "pushed, hit and struck" the plaintiff.78 The Colh/ns court
held that the intentional torts exception precluded the claim, reasoning that
if there had been no assault, no legal consequences could flow from the gov-
ernment's negligence. 79 The Colhns court recognized the federal employee-
third party distinction, noting that section 2680(h) barred a negligence ac-
tion only when the assault was by a federal employee.80
In Gibson v. Uni'tedSlates,8 1 the Third Circuit, addressing the issue for the
76. Id. at 930. A reasonable inference could be drawn in viewing the legislative
history that the intentional tort exception was established merely to prevent vicarious
liability for government negligence. Id. A review of the legislative history of 2680(h)
revealed that Congress was concerned with intentional torts which could be " 'diffi-
cult to make a defense against, and which are easily exaggerated.' " Id. (citing Tort
Clains Against the United States. Hearings on S 2690 Before the Subcom. on S. 2690 of the
Senate Comm. on theJud'icary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1940)). The court stated that it
did not see how the negligence claim in its case was any more difficult to defend
against or more easily exaggerated than "any other negligence action." Id. For a
discussion of the legislative history of § 2680(h), see note 31 supra.
But see Ballew v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 47 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd mem., 539
F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1976). In Ballew, the plaintiff alleged that federal agents were
negligent in obtaining a search warrant for his apartment. Id at 49. Federal agents
and one county police officer executed the warrants. Id at 48. Plaintiff, who met the
agents and officer with a gun upon their entry into his house, was subsequently shot.
Id. at 49. The court suggested that if one of the federal agents had been found to
have fired the shot which wounded the plaintiff, the suit would be barred under
§ 2680(h), whereas if it was the county police officer who had shot the plaintiff,
§ 2680(h) would not preclude the claim. Id. at 49.
77. 259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
78. Id. at 364. The complaint averred that the government "knew or should
have known" of the employee's propensity for violence. Id.
79. Id. at 364. The court observed that "Congress could easily have excepted
claimsfor assault. It did not; it used the broader language excepting claims arising out
ofassault." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court). The court concluded that since the
claim "arose" only because there was an assault and battery, the claim fell within the
lain language of § 2680(h). Id But see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31,
29.13. The authors suggest that the language "arising out of" may be more narrow
than language excepting claims for assault. Id. The phrase may "be construed as
referring only to actions where the very 'gist and essence' of plaintiff's theory of recov-
ery is one of the excepted bases of liability ....... Id. at 1655-56.
80. Collins, 259 F. Supp. at 364 (citing Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1954)).
81. 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 29: p. 10171034
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first time, declined to hold that section 2680(h) was a bar to a negligence
action involving intentional torts by federal employees.8 2 In Gibson, the
plaintiff, a Jobs Corps instructor, was assaulted by a Jobs Corps trainee.
8 3
The complaint alleged that under the Jobs Corps program the government
had selected trainees who were known juvenile delinquents and drug ad-
dicts, with histories of mental illness and violence.84 The Third Circuit rea-
soned that, given the circumstances, the assault was not a sufficient
intervening cause to sever the causal connection between the government's
negligence and the plaintiffs injury.8 5 Rather, the court observed, the in-
jury "had its roots in the Government's negligence." 86 The Gibson court dis-
tinguished Collins on the grounds that Col/ins involved conclusory allegations
of negligence based upon the same assault for which the action was
brought.8 7 In Bgyson v. United States,8" the district court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennslyvania relied on Gibson in holding that the alleged government
negligence in enlisting the assailant in the Army, resulting in the beating
82. See id. at 1395.
83. Id. at 1392-93. The assailant, a juvenile delinquent who was known to be a
narcotics addict, stabbed the plaintiff in the temple with a screwdriver. Id. at 1393.
The court regarded the assailant as an employee of the government. Id. at 1393-94.
84. Id. at 1394. The complaint further alleged that there had been prior inci-
dents of violence on the part of the trainees. Id. at 1393.
85. Id. at 1395. In the court's view, the attack was foreseeable since the assault
was the very risk which made the defendant's failure to take precautions negligent.
Id. (citing Harper & Kime, supra note 36, at 898). Therefore, under established tort
principles there was liability for negligence. 457 F.2d at 1395. For a discussion of the
duty to control the conduct of another, see note 36 supra.
86. 457 F.2d at 1395. As an alternative ground for holding the claim should not
be dismissed under the intentional torts exception, the court observed that there was
a question of fact whether the assailant even could have formed the requisite intent
to constitute an assault and battery since he was alleged to be under the influence of
narcotics at the time of the attack. Id. at 1396-97. For a discussion of the require-
ments for an assault and battery under the common law, see note 33 supra.
87. 457 F.2d at 1396 (citing Collhns, 259 F. Supp. at 363). In contrast, the train-
ees in Gibson were known to be drug addicts with behavioral problems. Id. Further-
more, the government had affirmatively accepted the duty of supervising their
behavior in a controlled environment. Id.
While the court recognized that some courts had drawn a distinction based on
whether or not the assailant was a government employee, the court stated that
"[n]one of these cases found it necessary to consider facts analogous to those
presented in this proceeding." Id. at 1396-97. If a stronger showing of negligence
makes it more likely the injury had "its roots in negligence," Gibson may be read as
suggesting that when an assailant is an employee of the government, § 2680(h) is less
likely to preclude a negligence claim, since there is a greater duty to control the
conduct of the assailant when the assailant is an employee of the alleged negligent
party. Id See also Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 824. Despite the Gibson
court's statement that the assailant was a government employee, some cases have
attempted to distinguish Gibson on the basis that Gibson did not involve a government
employee assailant. See Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350, 1355 n.4 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980); Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647, 651
(D.S.C. 1981).
88. 463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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death of plaintiffs decedent, stated an actionable claim under the FTCA.8 9
Against this background, the Shearer court first addressed the issue of
whether the claim that the government negligently failed to supervise or to
discharge Heard was barred by the Feres doctrine. 90 "The pivotal question
under the Feres analysis," Judge Higginbotham explained, "is whether the
servicemen sustained the injury either in the 'course of' or 'incident to' his
military service." 9' The court observed that the application of these con-
clusory standards turns on the specific facts defining the injured serviceman's
relationship with the military at the time and place the injury was sus-
tained. 92 Judge Higginbotham identified several relevant factors in the Feres
analysis and noted that the controlling factors often seem to be the status
and activity of the injured serviceman. 9 3 The majority explained that the
89. Id. at 912. In Bryson, plaintiff's son, a private in the United States Army, was
killed by another soldier, one Weidenhammer. Id. at 910. The decedent had gone to
the aid of Weidenhammer, who was intoxicated in the Army barracks at the time.
Id. Weidenhammer subsequently became violent, striking the decedent's head
against the floor. Id. Plaintiff did not sue the government vicariously for
Weidenhammer's intentional tort, but for the government's alleged negligence. Id. at
910-12. The complaint alleged that the government was negligent in accepting and
retaining Weidenhammer in the Army, due to his " 'background of emotional
problems, lack of maturity, (and) lack of average intelligence.' " Id. at 910. The
court held that the death of the decedent could reasonably be said to have " 'had its
roots in the Government's negligence.' " Id. at 912 (citing Gdbson, 457 F.2d at 1395).
The court further held that the claim was not precluded by the Feres doctrine.
Id. at 914. For a discussion of this aspect of Byson, see note 27 supra.
90. 723 F.2d at 1105. Judge Higginbotham characterized the "thrust of the
Feres doctrine [as the] prevent[ion of] an action against the government for 'injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.' " Id. (citations omitted). Judge Higginbotham regarded the principle un-
derlying the Feres doctrine as minimizing judicial interference with the " 'peculiar
and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors .... " .Id. (citing Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977)) (additional citation
omitted). For a discussion of the Feres doctrine, see notes 14-29 and accompanying
text supra.
91. 723 F.2d at 1105 (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954);
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d
1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. den ed, 456 U.S. 972 (1982)). Judge Higgin-
botham noted that the terms " 'in the course of' and 'incident to' " service are "not
self-evident truths that leap out to illuminate any factual situation." Id.
92. Id The court pointed out that under the Supreme Court's cases the military
was immune from suits under the FTCA which arose out of" 'negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of' an injured serviceman's military duty."
Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977);
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
93. 723 F.2d at 1105. Judge Higginbotham noted four factors which control the
Feres analysis: 1) the status of the soldier at the time of injury; 2) the location where
the injury occurred; 3) the nature of the serviceman's activity and 4) whether the
injured serviceman was acting pursuant to orders at the time of injury. Id. (citations
omitted). Judge Higginbotham summarized: "Generally, an off-duty serviceman
not on the military base and not engaged in military activity at the time of injury,
can recover under FTCA; an on-duty serviceman, however, is usually barred from
recovery." Id. at 1106 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring
recovery for an on-duty serviceman injured on base); Brooks v. United States, 337
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district court, in holding that Feres barred the present claim, had improperly
switched the focus away from the activity and status of the injured serviceman
at the time and place of injury to a "lor/feasor status-activity analysis."'94 Ac-
cording to Judge Higginbotham, the two cases relied upon by the district
court stood for the narrower proposition that medical treatment received by
an active duty soldier at a military hospital is by its nature an activity or
benefit which is "incident to military service."
9 5
Judge Higginbotham explained that a proper application of the Feres
analysis to the present case would focus upon the fact that the victim was on
leave and out of state at the time of the kidnapping and murder. 96 Further,
he observed, "being kidnapped off base at gun point" could never be consid-
ered a benefit of military status akin to medical treatment. 97 Therefore, the
court concluded, there was no "legitimate basis" upon which Feres could be
held to preclude plaintiffs claim. 98
Turning to the issue of whether the FTCA claim was barred under the
intentional torts exception, the Shearer court observed that section 2680(h)
does not necessarily preclude a claim against the government for negligence
just because the injury is brought about by the assault and battery of a gov-
ernment employee. 99 Rather, the court stated, the "FTCA simply requires
that the intentional tort must 'have its roots in government negligence.' "100
The court explained that a complaint alleged an intentional tort which had
U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (permitting recovery for off-duty serviceman injured on personal
business)). For a discussion of Brooks, see note 20 supra. For a discussion of Feres, see
notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
94. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added). Judge Higginbotham noted that the undis-
puted evidence indicated that Shearer was off-base, on leave, and not acting incident
to any military activity at the time of his murder. Id. He continued:
The district court's error stems from its singular focus on the status and
activity of the allegedly negligent parties (i.e. Heard's superior officers)
without considering the status and activity of the injured party. Conse-
quently the district court improperly concluded that appellant's "allega-
tions relate directly to decisions of military personnel made in the course of
the performance of their military duty and, therefore, are barred."
d. (quoting App. at 25a).
95. Id. at 1106 (citing Johnson v. United States, 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)) (further citation omitted). By relying on an im-
proper interpretation of these cases, Judge Higginbotham stated, the district court
never considered the status or activity of the injured serviceman. Id. For a discussion
of Henning, see note 29 supra.
96. Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 136-38, 146 (1950); Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50-52 (1949)). For a discussion of Brooks, see note 20
supra. For a discussion of Feres, see notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
97. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
98. 1d.
99. Id For a discussion of § 2680(h), the intentional torts exception to the
FTCA, see notes 30-89 and accompanying text supra.
100. 723 F.2d at 1106 (citing Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395-97
(3d Cir. 1972); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1966)).
For a discussion of Underwood, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
1983-84] 1037
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"its roots in [government] negligence" when it pleaded facts indicating that
the government should have known of its employee's dangerous propensities
and reasonably anticipated his injurious act.10 1 Conversely, the court stated
that when a complaint merely contains conclusory allegations of government
negligence, the intentional torts exception properly precludes the claim.102
The court found that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts which, if true,
would reveal government knowledge of the assailant's violent propensi-
ties.10 3 Therefore, the court concluded that the claim was not precluded by
the intentional tort exception. 104
Judge Garth, in dissent, first stated his conclusion that the claim was
precluded by Feres. 10 5 However, Judge Garth chose to base his dissent upon
101. 723 F.2d at 1107 (citing Gibson, 457 F.2d at 1395-96; Underwood v. United
States, 356 F.2d 92, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1966)). In such a situation the assault and bat-
tery could be regarded as the "natural result" of the failure of the government to
exercise due care. Id. (citing Gibson, 457 F.2d at 1395-96; United States v. Shively,
345 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965)). As such, the assault and
battery was not a sufficient intervening force to sever the causal relation between the
government's negligence and the plaintiffs injury. Id. (citing Gibson, 457 F.2d at
1395; Underwood, 356 F.2d at 99-100).
102. 723 F.2d at 1107 (citations omitted). Nor could there by recovery if negli-
gence was a "remote cause" of the injury, Judge Higginbotham continued. Id.
The court distinguished a Tenth Circuit decision, which held that § 2680(h)
barred suit where the assailant was a government employee, on the grounds that the
Tenth Circuit dealt with a claim based on mere conclusory allegations of negligence.
Id. at 1107-08 (citing Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 885 (1980)). For a discussion of Naisbilt, see notes 46-50 and accompanying
text supra. The court stated that in Naisbitt the complaint failed to allege any facts
that would establish that the government knew or should have known of either the
assailant's past or future violent propensities. Id at 1107-08. "In bringing a claim,"
Judge Higginbotham explained, "a plaintiff cannot merely point to an assault and
battery and then claim, based simply on the occurrence of the intentional tort, that
the government was negligent for not having anticipated the offensive action." Id. at
1107. (citations omitted).
103. 723 F.2d at 1107. Judge Higginbotham stated:
The following facts are critical: Heard had been convicted and imprisoned
for killing a civilian while in the Army. He was released from the prison less
than four months prior to killing Shearer. Several months before Shearer
was murdered, high-ranking military officers, aware of Heard's violent dis-
position, recommended his discharge. Nevertheless, Heard remained in the
Army and was treated as a member in good standing. Despite Heard's pre-
vious murder and the Army's knowledge of his disposition, enlisted men,
including Shearer, were not warned about his violent past or present dispo-
sition. We believe these alleged facts are sufficient to withstand a summary
judgment motion based on the intentional tort exception to the FTCA.
Id. These facts, he felt, "would permit a court to find that the government's negli-
gence proximately caused Shearer's injury, thus, this case fell closer to the rubric of
Gibson facts, not to that of Naisbt't." Id. at 1108. See Gibson v. United States, 457
F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding government liable for failure to take reason-
able steps to protect plaintiff from a class of government employees known to be
"dangerously sick"). For a discussion of Gibson, see notes 81-87 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of Naisbitt, see notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
104. 723 F.2d at 1108.
105. Id. (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth observed, however, that it was not
necessary to address the Fetes issue given his disposition of the issue of whether the
1038 [Vol. 29: p. 10 17
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his belief that the claim was barred under the intentional torts exception. 0 6
Judge Garth explained that it was necessary to look beyond the plaintiff's
allegations of negligence to determine " 'whether, in substance and essence, the
claim arises out of an assault and battery.' ",107 The dissent stated that the
majority of courts which had dealt with government negligence claims predi-
cated on the intentional tort of a government employee had found the inten-
tional torts exception an insurmountable hurdle.' 08 Judge Garth approved
of the approach which recognized that "'[i]n any case in which the em-
ployee has intentionally injured another, the tort asserted against the gov-
ernment, regardless of whether it is called negligence, is indeed an
intentional tort attributable to the government.' "109
Judge Garth stated that the Third Circuit's decision in Gibson was not
intentional torts exception barred the claim. Id. n.1 (Garth, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of Judge Garth's analysis of the intentional torts exception issue, see notes
106-12 and accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, Judge Garth did point out that
the Third Circuit had previously held that the proper inquiry under Feres is directed
to the time and location where the alleged negligence occurred. 723 F.2d at 1108 n. 1
(Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)). The time and place of the alleged negligence in this
case were some months prior to Shearer's induction into the Army, in Germany. Id.
However, Judge Garth noted his concern that the majority addressed the time and
location of the znzjuy to the plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of this
aspect of the majority's analysis of the Fetes issue, see text accompanying note 92
supra. For a discussion of how federal courts have addressed the issue of whether the
time of the injury or negligent act should be controlling under Fetes, see notes 28-29
and accompanying text supra.
106. 723 F.2d at 1108 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth explained: "[Mrs.
Shearer's] complaint, although appearing on the surface to charge negligence is, in
truth, no more than a complaint seeking monetary recovery for an assault and bat-
tery perpetrated by a fellow soldier upon her son. Congress, however, has refused to
permit recovery against the Government for such intentional actions." Id.
107. 723 F.2d at 1110 (Garth, J., dissenting) (quoting Nichols. v. United States,
236 F. Supp. 260, 263 (N.D. Miss. 1964)) (further citation omitted) (emphasis sup-
plied by Judge Garth). Judge Garth first noted that the federal courts were witness-
ing a pattern among plaintiffs, who were increasingly pleading intentional torts cases
in the negligence formula, so as to avoid the restriction of the Fetes doctrine and
Congress' limitation under the intentional torts exception. Id. at 1108-09 (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Shearer, Judge Garth observed, was the Third Cir-
cuit's first occasion to address the issue, although the court had approached it "tan-
gentially" in Gibson. Id. at 1109 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Gibson v. United
States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972)).
108. Id. at 1109-10 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Wine v. United States, 705
F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983); Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert.
dented, 449 U.S. 885 (1980); Hughes v. Sullivan, 514 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1980),
aft'd sub nom. Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1981); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F.
Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1972); Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa.
1966)). Judge Garth was convinced that these courts pointed the way to the "proper
analysis" of the issue. Id. at 1110 (Garth, J., dissenting).
109. Id at 1110 (Garth, J., dissenting) (quoting Naisbilt, 611 F.2d at 1356). As
such, the negligence claim was only an " 'alternative theory of liability.' " Id. (quot-
ing Naisbitt v. United States, 469 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Utah 1979)). The Naisbitt
court concluded that the intentional tort superseded any government negligence as a
23
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inconsistent with his analysis, since the assailant's attack in Gibson was not an
intervening act of such magnitude to break the causal chain between the
government's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.' 10 Judge Garth distin-
guished the present case from Gibson on the ground that in the present case,
the government had not accepted any duty to care for or control the assail-
ant, and thus was under no "special obligation" to prevent Heard from
harming others."' While recognizing the "unfortunate result" that would
occur under what would be his disposition of the case, Judge Garth believed
it was necessary to respect congressional intent in enacting section
2680(h). 11 2
causal force on the facts of that case; hence the claim was barred under § 2680(h). Id.
n.4 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Naisbiti, 611 F.2d at 1356).
Judge Garth approved of the Fourth Circuit's holding that the FTCA did not
waive immunity from liability for a government employee's independent assault,
even when the assault was allegedly traceable to government negligence in retaining
that employee after it had knowledge of his prior misconduct. Id. at 1111 (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hughes v. Sullivan, 514 F. Supp. 667, 670 (E.D. Va. 1980), af'dsub
nom. Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). Judge
Garth questioned the majority's reliance upon a case in which the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that because the intervening assault by the government employee was the sole
proximate cause of the injury, the claim arose out of an assault and thus § 2680(h)
barred a claim phrased in negligence. Id. at 1111-12 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965)).
Judge Garth felt that Shively was consistent with Hughes, Naisbi, and the view that
§ 2680(h) barred negligence claims arising out of assaults by government employees.
Id. at 1112 (Garth, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1112 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth observed that in Gibson the
government had accepted the duty of care of trainees who were known to be drug
addicts and to have behavioral problems. Id. (citing Gibson, 457 F.2d at 1395).
Therefore, Judge Garth stated that the government was under a duty to prevent the
assailant from causing harm to others. Id.
Judge Garth did not find that Lonits or Bgson, cases allowing recovery on an
analogous government negligence theory, warranted a different result. Id. at 1112-13
n.6 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Loritts v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D.
Mass. 1980); Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). In Loritts,
the government had voluntarily undertaken to provide escorts for plaintiff's choral
group. Id. Having assumed this affirmative responsibility, it was properly held liable
for breach of duty. Id B~yson was "not persuasive" because it had merely cited Gibson
in a "non-analytical fashion" and "misread the critical distinction made in Gibson
[between its circumstances and those in Collins]." Id. at 1113 n.6 (Garth, J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of Gibson, see notes 81-87 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Loritls, see notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
B9yson, see notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
111. 723 F.2d at 1113 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth noted that Heard
was not known to have medical or behavioral problems comparable to those of the
assailant in Gibson, who had a known addiction to mind-controlling drugs. 'd All
that the government knew about Heard was that he had committed a crime, albeit
heinous, for which he had served his sentence. Id. Nor, Judge Garth observed, was
Heard part of any government rehabilitation program in which the government had
accepted the duty to take care of Heard in a controlled environment. Id.
112. Id. at 1109, 1113 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth noted that the merits
of the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act were not before the court. Id. at
1113 (Garth, J., dissenting). What was before the court was an attempted "subter-
fuge," an action cloaked in negligence to avoid dismissal under the intentional torts
1040
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On March 7, 1984, a petition for rehearing en banc of Shearer was de-
nied." 3 Judge Adams believed that a rehearing was warranted because of
the importance of both the intentional torts exception and Feres issues, and
the tension existing among the circuits as to the application of each. 114
Judge Garth thought that the whole court should hear the case in order to
fulfill the need of a uniform application of the congressional mandate of
section 2680(h)." 5 Judge Garth noted that every court of appeals which
had decided the issue of whether § 2680(h) precludes claims of government
negligence, on facts analogous to Shearer, had concluded that the claim was
barred. 116
In analyzing the Shearer opinion, it is submitted that the court's Fetes
analysis correctly focused upon the status of the injured serviceman, that is,
his relation to the military, rather than upon the status of the tortfeasor. " 7
It is further submitted that the court's reliance upon Shearer's authorized
exception. Id. To say that such a claim did not arise out of an assault and battery
" 'would be to blink at the exclusionary provisions of § 2680.' " Id. (quoting Lam-
bertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976)).
113. 729 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1984). Judges Adams, Hunter, Weis, and Garth
would have granted the petition. Judges Adams and Garth each filed a separate
statement.
114. Id. (Adams, J., Statement Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehearing).
Judge Adams noted that in holding that § 2680(h) did not preclude a claim against
the government for a murder committed by an off-duty serviceman, the Shearer opin-
ion was in direct conflict with several circuits. Id. (citing Wine v. United States, 705
F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam)). Furthermore, the Shearer majority's holding that the Feres doctrine did not
preclude Shearer's claim "raise[d] serious policy concerns about judicial review of
military decisions." Id (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
115. Id. at 627 (Garth, J., Statement Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehearing).
116. Id. at 266 (Garth, J., Statement Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehearing).
Judge Garth observed, as he did in his dissent in Shearer, that one of the cases relied
upon by the majority, in holding that § 2680(h) did not preclude Shearer's claim,
specifically held that a plaintiff could not recover for government negligence when
plaintiffs claim arose out of an assault. Id. at 266-67 (Garth, J., Statement Sur De-
nial of the Petition for Rehearing) (citing United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965)). Judge Garth believed that a rehearing was
appropriate "if for no other reason than to clear up a potentional jurisprudential
murkiness" underlying the Shearer majority's opinion. Id. at 267 (Garth, J., State-
ment Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehearing).
117. See United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (status of ser-
viceman, not that of tortfeasor controlling; thus serviceman on active duty could not
recover although tortfeasor was a civilian federal employee), cerl. denied, 393 U.S.
1053 (1969). The Third Circuit has also focused on the status of the serviceman. See
Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1976) (Feres doctrine turns on the
serviceman's status), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Henning v. United States, 446
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Bryson v. United States,
463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Sheppard v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). Neither Henning nor Johnson v. United States, both cited by the district court
as support for a tortfeasor-status analysis, appear to change the Feres inquiry of the
status of the serviceman. See Johnson v. United States, 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1980)
(serviceman's activity and status are relevant factors), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 1018
(1981); Hennig, 446 F.2d at 777 (Feres analysis predicated on plaintiffs military sta-
tus at time of negligent act). These cases did appear, however, to adopt an inquiry
1983-84] 1041
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leave status as a factor militating against the application of the Feres doctrine
was proper. I 18 It is suggested, however, that the dissent was justified in ex-
pressing concern over the majority's inquiry into the status of the serviceman
at the time of the thju', and apparently dispensing with the established focus
upon the serviceman's status at the time of the tortious act.' 19 Previously, the
Third Circuit had regarded the serviceman's status at the time of the govern-
ment's negligence, rather than at the time of his injury, as the proper inquiry
under Feres.1
20
which focused upon the time of the negligent act rather than upon the time of the
serviceman's injury. For a discussion of Johnson and Hennig, see note 29 supra.
118. See Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1072 (1977); Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In holding
that Feres precluded the claim before it, the Thomason court noted that not only was
the plaintiff on active duty, he was also "not on any type of leave or pass." Thomason,
539 F.2d at 957 (quoting Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J.
1975)). In Bgson, the claim was not barred by Feres because the serviceman was on a
weekend pass at the time of his death. Bgyson, 463 F. Supp. at 914.
Both Thomason and Bryson indicate that the fact that Shearer was not on the
military base at the time of his death is not itself controlling. See Thomason, 539 F.2d
at 957; Byson, 463 F. Supp. at 913-14. The serviceman's status as off-base and on
authorized leave has not always prevented Feres from barring a claim for the service-
man's injury. See Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (de-
ceased subject to military discipline for using military craft although on authorized
leave at time of airplane crash; therefore Feres precluded the claim). However, when
the serviceman is not using any of the benefits available to him through his military
status, and is both off duty and off the military base, an FTCA claim has been held to
be actionable. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). In Brooks, one service-
man was killed and another injured while on authorized leave off the base and driv-
ing in a private automobile. Id. at 50. In holding that an FTCA claim could be
maintained against the government, the Brooks Court reasoned that the circum-
stances of the accident were in no way related to the servicemen's Army careers. Id.
at 52. Similarly, in Shearer, based on the factual record, the circumstances would
indicate that Shearer's murder was not caused by his being in the service "except in
the sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired." See id.
Brooks held that such a tenuous connection would not preclude a serviceman's claim.
Id.
119. See 723 F.2d at 1108 n.1. (Garth, J., dissenting). The majority itself cited
Stencel Aero Engneering as stating that Feres precluded claims against the military that
arose "out of 'negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of' an
injured serviceman's military duty." Id. at 1105 (citing Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977)). This language seems to indicate that the
proper inquiry under Feres is the serviceman's status at the time of the alleged tor-
tious act rather than at the time of the injury.
120. See Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983) (birth defect
caused by father's exposure to nuclear radiation while on active military duty), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1272 (1984); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir.
1971) (injuries occurred subsequent to discharge; medical malpractice occurred while
plaintiff was still in the military), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). For a discussion of
Mondeli and Henning, see note 29 supra.
The majority of other jurisdictions has likewise held the proper inquiry to be the
time of the government's negligent act rather than the time of the injury. For a brief
discussion of these cases, see note 29 supra.
The Shearer majority would probably have reached the same conclusion on the
Feres issue whether it focused upon Shearer's status at the time of the government's
negligence or at the time of Shearer's injury. See Hennbig, 446 F.2d at 778 (refusing to
1042 [Vol. 29: p. 10 17
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It is submitted that the Shearer court correctly recognized that the inten-
tional torts exception to the FTCA should not necessarily bar claims collater-
ally involving an assault and battery. 12 1 It is also suggested that the Shearer
court's implicit rejection of the federal government employee-third party dis-
tinction is an appropriate step toward a "consistent and equitable" reading
of the intentional torts exception. 122 In not adopting this distinction, the
regard the government's negligence in failing to warn as an ongoing wrong, instead
fixing the time of the claim at the initial negligent decision). By this reasoning, the
government's failure to discharge Heard would not be regarded as ongoing negli-
gence; hence it would have occurred prior to Shearer's induction into the Army. 723
F.2d at 1108 n. 1 (Garth, J., dissenting). There appears to be even less of a connection
between military service and decisions occurring before one is inducted into the Army
than between service and occurrences after discharge. Courts have generally held
that Feres is not a bar when the negligent act causing plaintiffs injury has occurred
subsequent to plaintiff's discharge. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954)
(negligently performed operation on veteran's knee); Schwartz v. United States, 230
F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (post discharge negligent medical treatment). But see
Breunig v. United States, No. 83-290 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 1983) (servicemen were per-
forming tasks incident to their military service at time of their injuries, therefore,
claim precluded under Ferej, fact that some of the government's tortious acts took
place prior to their enlistment in the service is irrelevant).
Given the fact that Judge Garth believed that the proper inquiry was the time of
the government's negligence, and that occurred prior to Shearer's induction in the
Army, it is unclear why Judge Garth opined that the claim was precluded under
Feres. See 723 F.2d at 1108 & n. 1 (Garth, J., dissenting).
121. See Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968); Loritts v. United
States, 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980). The legislative history of § 2680(h)
reveals that the Congressional concern was with liability for deliberate torts, claims
which were thought to be more difficult to defend than are negligence actions. See
Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 809-10. For a discussion of the legislative
history of § 2680(h), see note 31 supra. It does not appear that defending against
negligence which is alleged to be the proximate cause of an injury involving an inter-
vening assault would be more difficult than defending against a simple claim where
negligence is alleged as the direct and proximate cause of the injury. Liuzzo v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 930 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
122. See Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (preclud-
ing claim for government negligence based upon the intentional tortfeasor's govern-
ment employee status is neither consistent nor equitable); Comment, Section 2680(h),
supra note 31, at 821-22. While the Shearer majority did not expressly reject this dis-
tinction, its observation that the intentional torts exception does not necessarily bar a
negligence claim against the government where the injury is caused by an assault and
battery by a federal employee contradicts the employee-non-employee distinction.
See Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United States,
662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647
(D.S.C. 1981).
Judge Garth's approval of these cases indicates his approval of the federal em-
ployee-third-party distinction. See 723 F.2d at 1109-12 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge
Garth specifically relied on the reasoning of the Naisbitt court which recognized this
distinction. See id. at 1110 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Naisbitt, 611 F.2d at 1356).
At the same time, Judge Garth cited Gibson with approval. 723 F.2d at 1112-13
(Garth, J., dissenting) (citing Gibson, 457 F.2d at 1395). Since Gibson held that a valid
negligence claim could be alleged in at least some cases where the injury resulted
from the assault and battery of a government employee, it is unclear whether Judge
Garth would adopt the employee-non-employee distinction. For a discussion of Gb-
son, see notes 81-87 and accompanying text supra.
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Third Circuit has correctly recognized that the "essence" of a negligence
claim against the government under the FTCA should not depend upon the
intentional tortfeasor's government employee status.' 23 It is suggested that
Shearer's resolution of this issue is consistent with Gibson.12 4
It is further suggested that in lieu of the employee/non-employee dis-
tinction, the proper inquiry under section 2680(h) should be whether a valid
claim of negligence is alleged.' 25 A court should determine whether the gov-
ernment owed a duty to the plaintiff not to be negligent, and if it did,
whether the breach of that duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
123. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 822. The employee-non-em-
ployee distinction fails to recognize that the plaintiff is alleging not one but two sepa-
rate torts. Id. at 816. Besides the assault by the employee, the plaintiff is alleging
government negligence in not preventing the foreseeable assault. Id. The courts
which bar negligence claims involving assaults by government employees equate the
assault with the negligence claim, and label each in essence "an intentional tort at-
tributable to the government." See Naisbilt, 611 F.2d at 1356. The negligence claim,
however, is not merely an alternate remedy, but a completely distinct tort. Com-
ment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 816. Traditional tort law recognizes that an
assault may give rise to liability not only for the intentional wrong but also for negli-
gence in failure to discipline or to warn others. See PROSSER, supra note 33, § 56, at
383-85. Where there is an assault by someone other than a government employee,
the courts have acknowledged the assault and the negligence as two separate torts.
See Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1968); Panella v. United States,
216 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1954). It appears illogical to hold that there are two
distinct torts in the one case and only one tort in the other. See Liuzzo, 508 F. Supp.
at 930.
It is submitted that an assailant's government employee status actually makes it
more likely that a bona fide negligence claim can be stated based on the government's
failure to prevent a foreseeable intentional tort. See Gibson v. United States, 457
F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1972) (one's duty to control conduct of another is greater
when the other person is his employee). The trend of cases recognizing the employee-
non-employee distinction contradict modern tort law principles since they would
more readily hold the government liable for failure to control the actions of a non-
employee than an employee. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 821. As
noted by one commentator, "the employee/non-employee approach creates troubling
incongruities. Under th[is] approach, the government must scrutinize the behavior
of individuals not in its employ, . . . but need not scrutinize the behavior of its own
employees over whom it may exert a greater degree of control." Id. (footnote
omitted).
124. See Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972). In Gibson, the
court determined that the government could be liable despite the fact that the assail-
ant was a federal employee because its failure to control the assailant constituted a
breach of the duty that it owed to the plaintiff. Id. at 1395-96. While the facts in
Shearer did not indicate the same degree of control by the government over the assail-
ant as in Gibson, the government's knowledge of Heard's violent propensities, unlike
the allegations of negligence because of the government's knowledge in Colihns, was
not "based upon the very assault for which the action [was] brought." See id. at 1396.
For a discussion of Gibson, see notes 81-87 and accompanying text supra. For a discus-
sion of Colh'ns, see notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra.
125. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 829-31. It is submitted that
this approach better serves the purpose of the FTCA of allocating responsibility for
injuries due to the government's negligence than does an approach making artifical
distinctions based on the intentional tortfeasor's employment status. Id. at 825, 831.
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jury. 126 It is suggested that a court may dispose of spurious claims through
application of these traditional tort principles.1
2 7
Although it appeared that Shearer had shifted the Feres analysis to the
status of the serviceman at the time of his injury,' 28 the Third Circuit has
more recently indicated that it will continue to regard the serviceman's sta-
tus at the time of the tortious act as the relevant inquiry.'
29
In terms of the intentional torts exception, Shearers abrogation of the
federal employee-third party distinction signals greater liberality in constru-
126. Id. at 825-28. An analysis in terms of traditional tort principles is consistent
with the FTCA's waiver of governmental immunity for torts recognized by state law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982); Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 827. For
the text and a discussion of § 1346(b), see note 11 supra. By focusing on the inten-
tional tortfeasor's status as a government employee, courts may end up ignoring state
law which recognizes the negligent party's liability for the assault of another. Com-
ment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 829. In Natibitt, for instance, the court held as
an alternative ground for dismissing the claim that the government's negligence
could not be a proximate cause of the injury as a matter of law. Natzbit, 611 F.2d at
1356. In doing so the court ignored applicable state law which may have allowed
recovery against the negligent party. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 829
(citations omitted).
127. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 830-31. Admittedly, constru-
ing § 2680(h) so as not to preclude negligence suits per se against the government
when the assailant is a government employee creates some risk that the number of
claims filed against the government will increase. See Shearer v. United States, 729
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1984) (Garth, J., Statement Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehear-
ing). It should be emphasized, however, that § 2680(h) is only intended as a jurisdic-
tional bar. Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 804 n.4, 830. After
establishing that the claim is not precluded by § 2680(h), a plaintiff must still estab-
lish that there was a duty on the part of the government to protect against the assault
because of a special relationship with either the assailant or the plaintiff and that the
breach of that duty was a proximate cause of the injury. See Harper & Kime, supra
note 36, at 904. For a discussion of liability in negligence for failure to control the
conduct of another, see note 36 supra. See also Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391,
1395 (3d Cir. 1972) (although claim not precluded by § 2680(h), government could
not be liable to the plaintiff for negligence when it did not have control over plain-
tiff's assailant).
Furthermore, as interpreted by the courts, § 2680(h) may not be circumvented
merely through artful pleading. See Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.
1972) (plaintiff's conclusory allegation of government negligence properly barred by
§ 2680(h)). Cases such as Naisbiti and Colins, which include only conclusory allega-
tions of government knowledge of its employees' violent propensities, may properly
be dismissed. For a discussion of Naisbitt, see notes 46-50 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Collins, see notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra.
128. See 723 F.2d at 1105-06.
129. See Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1984). In Heilman, a
servicemen was exposed to atomic radiation while on active duty with the United
States Navy. Id. at 1105-06. Subsequent to his discharge he contracted cancer and
died, allegedly due to this exposure. Id. at 1106. The court stated that the proper
focus under Feres was " 'not upon when the injury occurred or when the claim be-
came actionable, but rather the time of, and circumstances surrounding the negligent
act. " Id. at 1106-07 (quoting Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)). Therefore, any claim for injuries arising
from the exposure while the deceased was on active duty was precluded by Feres. Id.
at 1107.
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ing the language of the intentional torts exception and will avoid the inequi-
ties resulting from an overly technical construction.130 The inconsistent
interpretations among the federal circuits demonstrate that what has been
regarded as a "seemingly simple exception" to the waiver of government
immunity has in fact been the source of much conflict.' 3 1 It is suggested
that this inconsistency may provide sufficient impetus for the Supreme Court
to finally resolve this issue. 132 Perhaps a better alternative would be for
Congress to clarify what is meant by the phrase "arising out of an assault
[and] battery."' 133 Until that time, Shearer can be viewed as an attempt to
limit what have become perhaps the two exceptions to the waiver of govern-
ment immunity most disturbing to the judicial conscience. 134
Jamieson M. Schiff
130. See Comment, Section 2680(h), supra note 31, at 828.
131. See Taylor v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.S.C. 1981). For a
discussion of the interpretation of § 2680(h) among the federal circuits, see notes 34-
89 and accompanying text supra.
132. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the Shearer case. See 53
U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-194).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). It is unclear from the language of § 2680(h)
whether Congress intended to bar or allow claims alleging government negligence
when the plaintiff was directly injured by an assault and battery. See Comment,
Secion 2680(h), supra note 31, at 808-09. The term "arising out of" may be construed
as barring all claims where an assault is involved or, on the other hand, as barring
only those claims where in "essence" the claim is predicated on an assault and bat-
tery. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 29.13. Furthermore, the legislative
history on the section does not provide a certain answer. Collins v. United States,
259 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1966). For a discussion of the legislative history of
§ 2680(h), see note 31 supra.
134. See Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1111-13 (3d Cir. 1984) (Ad-
ams, J., concurring). For a discussion of other judicial commentary on the Feres doc-
trine, see note 17 supra. For a discussion of judicial comments on the intentional tort
exception, see note 31 supra.
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